

## Message Text

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S E C R E T STATE 080238

LIMDIS

FOLLOWING SENT ACTION O SECSTATE INFO ADDIS ABABA KHARTOUM  
NAIROBI APR 7, 1975 FROM MOGADISCIO REPEATED TO YOU:

QUOE S E C R E T MOGADISCIO 0506

LIMDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, MARR, SO, UR, ET, US

SUBJECT: SIAD, THE SOVIET UNION AND ETHIOPIA

REF: MOGADISCIO 8404

SUMMARY.

IN VIEW OF CURREN UNCERTAINTY IN ETHIOPIA AND DIFFICULT CHOICES  
US WILL CONTINUE TO FACE IN ADDIS, WE BELIEVE IT IMPORTANT O ATTEMPT  
TO UPDATE SIAD'S INTENTIONS REGARDING ETHIOPIA, TAKING SOVIET FACTOR  
MORE SQUARELY INTO ACCOUNT. CURRENT IRACTICAL CONSTRAINTS ON SIAD--  
WHICH ARE FORMIDAB  
E-- INCLUDE DROUGHT, SOMALI ECONOMIC PROSTRATION  
BU, MORE BASIC THAN EIHER, SIAD'S SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH  
SOVIET UNION. SOVIET STAKE IN SOMA  
IA INVOLVES AMBITIONS IN RED  
SEA BASIN, IN AFRICA, ARABIAN PENINSULA AND INDIAN OCEAN WHICH NOW  
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APPEAR TO GO FAR BEYOND ANY IMMEDIATE ADVANTAGES AVAILABLE IN OGADEN.  
WE T INK SIAD AN ACCOMPLICE TO SOVIET REGIONAL AMBITIONS. WE ALSO  
BELIEVE THA SO LONG AS US MAINTAINS EVEN MINIMAL MILITARY SUPPORT  
ROLE IN ETHIOPIA, SOVIE ABILITY TO RESTRAIN SIAD IN SUPPORT OF ITS

LARGER OBJECTIVES IS REINFORCED. WE BELIEVE MOREOVER THAT SIAD HAS PHILOSOPHICALLY ACCEPTED SOVIET RESTRAINT, NOT IN ANY TACIT SURRENDER OF SOVEREIGNTY BUT IN HIS IDEOLOGICAL COMMITMENT TO BUILD SOMALI SOCIALIST STATE UNDER SOVIET TUTELAGE. WHILE SOVIET ROLE IN SOMALIA, IN RED SEA, INDIAN OCEAN, ETC., SEEKS OUR ULTIMATE EXPULSION FROM AREA, WE BELIEVE SHORT TERM SOVIET INFLUENCE IN SOMALIA CURRENTLY BENEFITS BOTH US AND ETHIOPIA. IF SOVIET INFLUENCE HERE THREATENED, OR REDUCED, THEN DANGERS TO ETHIOPIA WOULD BE INCREASED. SO LONG AS SOVIET INFLUENCE PARAMOUNT -- AS IT IS AT PRESENT -- THEN WE BELIEVE US AND ETHIOPIA HAVE MORE TIME TO SORT OUT THEIR PROBLEMS THAN IS COMMONLY SUPPOSED. END SUMMARY.

1. WE HAVE LONG KNOWN SIAD'S SOCIALIST AMBITIONS AND HIS CONVICTION THAT SOCIALISM IS ONLY  
HOPE FOR SOMALIA'S ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL  
DEVELOPMENT. IN THREE YEARS SINCE SIAD ADOPTED SCIENTIFIC SOCIALISM HE HAS PROVIDED ENOUGH EVIDENCE FOR US TO RECOGNIZE HIS ALLIANCE WITH PROGRESSIVE WORLD SOCIALISM, HIS BELIEF IN IS "SCIENTIFIC TRUTH AS DEMONSTRATED BY STRENGTH AND ACHIEVEMENTS OF USSR, AND HIS FAITH IN A HISTORICAL DIALECTIC WHOSE INEVITABLE RESULTS WILL REPLACE DYING IMPERIALISM WITH NEW SOCIAL ORDER BASED UPON SOVIET MODEL.

2. GIVEN UNREALITY OF MOST OF THIS THIRD WORLD RHETORIC, HOWEVER, WHAT WE HAVE LACKED TO DATE IS CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT SIAD'S MARXISM AND HIS COMPLICITY WITH SOVIETS IS NOT MERELY TOOL TO SERVE HIS LOCAL AMBITIONS, INCLUDING RECOVERY OF SOMALI LANDS IN HORN.

3. IN PAST, WE HAVE WEIGHED SIAD'S SOVIET TIES AND HIS IDEOLOGICAL CLAIMS CHIEFLY  
IN PRACTICAL TERMS. WE HAVE VIEWED THEM AS MEANS  
OF GETTING AND KEEPING SOVIET WEAPONRY. WE HAVE WATCHED NUMBERS AND KINDS OF WEAPONS BROUGHT TO SOMALIA BY RUSSIANS AND MEASURED THEIR MEANING ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY IN TERMS OF ETHIOPIA'S SECURITY. WE HAVE COUNTED NUMBERS OF SOVIET MILITARY ADVISORS IN SOMALIA, BUT HAVE GIVEN LESS  
WEIGHT TO THEIR POLITICAL COUNTERPARTS, IN USSR,  
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IN POLITICAL  
OFFICE AND IN PRESIDENCY DESPITE FACT THAT SIAD'S  
COLLABORATION WITH THESE ADVISORS, -- LIKE THE PRESENCE OF SAM-2'S  
AT MOGADISCIO -- IT ITSELF UNIQUE. WE HAVE AS A RESULT BEEN  
CONSIDERABLY LESS PRECISE ABOUT IDEOLOGICAL STRENGTH OF SIAD/SOVIET  
COLLABORATION AND ITS LARGER SIGNIFICANCE FOR AREA.

4. WITH THAT BACKGROUND IN MIND, WE BELIEVE THAT SOVIET INSTALLATION AT BERBERA -- REFERRED TO IN SCHLESINGER'S NEWSWEEK INTERVIEW --  
WOULD EFFECTIVELY DEMOLISH ANY DOUBTS WE HAVE ABOUT SIAD'S  
UNIQUE OR SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH SOVIET UNION. THERE IS  
IN OUR VIEW NO SATISFACTORY EXPLANATION FOR THIS MISSILE PRESENCE  
EXCEPT TO SHOW IRREFUTABLY SIAD'S SPECIAL STATUS AS MEMBER OF SOVIET-

LED SOCIALIST COMMONWEALTH. WE BELIEVE, IN SHORT, THAT SIAD IS NOW AN ACCOMPLICE OF SOVIET DIALECTIC, WHICH EXPLAINS HIS CONCENTRATION ON PROGRESSIVE NATION-BUILDING AT HOME AND HIS ACCEPTANCE OF MORE ADVANCED SOVIET WEAPONS ON SOMALI SOIL, NOT ONLY TO PROTECT SOMALIA FROM FORCES OF REACTION -- THE DIALECTICAL ENEMY -- BUT ALSO TO SERVE SOVIET STRATEGIC AMBITIONS IN AREA, WHICH WILL

ALSO BENEFIT SOMALIA AS MEMBER OF PROGRESSIVE COMMONWEALTH.

5. IN OUR VIEW, SIAD'S COLLUSION WITH SOVIETS MORE FULLY EXPLAINS SIAD'S ABSOLUTISM AT HOME AND HIS INFLEXIBILITY ABROAD (I.E., ARAB

LEAGUE), PARTICULARLY WHEN MORE MODERATION COULD HAVE BROUGHT ECONOMIC OR POLITICAL DIVIDENDS WITHOUT COMPROMISING SOVIET MILITARY SUPPORT. IT ALSO CLARIFIES HIS OVERTURES TO US, WHICH HE HAS PEGGED TO SOVIET/US DETENTE AND WHICH, IN OUR VIEW, DO NOT ONLY MEAN HE IS SEEKING RELIEF FROM SOVIET HEGEMONY (SEPTIL).

6. EVIDENCE OF STRENGTH OF SIAD'S IDEOLOGICAL TIES TO SOVIETS MOREOVER IS SEEN IN HIS HANDLING OF TWO PROBLEMS: ONE, THE CONTINUING ONE OF HIS RELATIONS WITH ARAB LEAGUE; AND SECONDLY, HIS EXECUTION OF SOMALI SHEIKHS.

7. A. WHATEVER BENEFITS SIAD EXPECTED FROM ARAB LEAGUE MEMBERSHIP, THE PAYOFF HAS BEEN SMALL. HIS REFUSAL TO SURRENDER MARXIST TINT TO SECRET

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HIS SOCIALISM

OR TO LOOSEN HIS SOVIET TIES, EVEN SYMBOLICALLY, HAS DENIED HIM ALL BUT MINIMAL ECONOMIC SUPPORT. WHILE HIS IDEOLOGICAL STUBBORNNESS HAS COST HIM ECONOMICALLY, IT HAS NOT DENIED HIM PARTICIPATION IN LEAGUE AFFAIRS, WHERE HIS POSITION HAS BEEN CONSISTENTLY ANTI-EGYPTIAN AND PRO-SOVIET. BECAUSE SOMALI-SOVIET FRIENDSHIP TREATY (JULY 1974) FOLLOWED HIS DECISION TO JOIN LEAGUE, LATTER WAS VIEWED AS A SOVIET ATTEMPT TO RECOVER ITS INFLUENCE. WE THINK SOVIET INFLUENCE WAS NEVER LOST AND BELIEVE SIAD'S ARAB LEAGUE DECISION WAS MOST SURELY ENDORSED BY SOVIETS BECAUSE OF POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC ADVANTAGES IT BROUGHT THEM. ITS MOST IMMEDIATE RESULT EMERGED MONTH LATER WHEN PLO and SOMALIA WERE JOINED TOGETHER UNDER ARRANGEMENT ARAB LEAGUE COULD ENDORSE, BUT WHICH SOVIET UNION PUT TOGETHER. SIAD'S GOALS IN LEAGUE ARE, WE CONCLUDE, POLITICAL NO LESS THAN ECONOMIC AND SERVE SOVIET'S REGIONAL INTERESTS, A FACT WHICH PERHAPS HAS NOT BEEN SUFFICIENTLY UNDERSCORED.

B. THE SHEIKH AFFAIR IS ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF SIAD'S FLEXIBILITY IN DEFENSE OF IDEOLOGY. LONG BEFORE HE JOINED ARAB LEAGUE, SIAD WAS ADVOCATE OF EQUAL RIGHTS FOR WOMEN, WHICH HAS BEEN IMPORTANT

PLANK IN HIS BUILDING SCHEME SINCE 1972. HIS PLANK WAS TAKEN FROM INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST PLATFORM AND HAS BEEN PUSHED BY SOVIETS, WHO HAVE SHREWDLY EXPLOITED FEMINIST LINKS IN SOMALIA, AN UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRY WITH FEW CADRES AVAILABLE FOR SOVIET PENETRATION. SIAD'S SUPPORT FOR WOMEN'S RIGHTS IS RESULT OF THAT IDEOLOGICAL COLABORATION AND SHEIKHS, WHO CHALLENGED IT, WERE EXECUTED.

IM WHILE IT IS RECKLESS TO CLAIM THAT SIAD'S RESRAINT IN OGADEN CAN BE THEORETICALLY GUARANTEED BY ANY SINGLE FACTOR, INCLUDING SOVIET LINK AND SOCIALIST NATION-BUILDING AT HOME, EVIDENCE TO DATE POINTS THAT WAY. SIAD'S ENERGIES HAVE BEEN EXCLUSIVELY DEVOTED TO BUILDING WITH SOVIET SUPPORT A SOCIALIST SOCIETY BASED ON SOVIET MODEL. HE HAS INTRODUCED AL POLITICAL AND SECURITY CONTROLS REQUIRED FOR THAT TASK; HE HAS LAUNCHED MASS INDOCTRINATION EFFORT AND SECRET

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ATTEMPTS AT CADRE FORMATION THROUGHOUT SOMALIA. HE HAS IMPRISONED THOSE GROUPS WHO WOULD DIVERT ATTENTION FROM SOCIALISM. HE IS BUILDING CAMPAIGN (MOGADISCIO 0388) AND HAS NOT RPT NOT REQUIRED SOMALI IRREDENISM TO GIVE COHERENCE OR PURPOSE TO HIS INTERNAL OR EXTERNAL POLICY.

9. IF SOVIET POSITION IN SOMALIA WERE TO BECOME SHAKY OR UNSURE, THEN CONSEQUENCES FOR ETHIOPIA WOULD BE MORE SERIOUS. IF SOVIET GRIP ON SIAD BEGAN TO SLIP, THEN IT IS DIFFICULT TO PREDICT WHAT OPTIONS MIGHT BE OPENED UP TO MAINTAIN CONTROL. ON SOMALI SIDE, REDUCTION OF SOVIET CONTROL OR SIAD'S OUSTER WOULD PROBABLY MEAN REVIVAL OF ETHNIC UNIFICATION AS PRINCIPAL POLICY GOAL, WITH INCREASED DANGERS TO OGADEN.

10. WHILE SIGNS EXIST IN PUBLIC AND IN GSDR CIRCLES OF GROWING DISSATISFACTION WITH STRENGTH OF SOVIET ROLE IN SOMALIA, WE DOUBT THAT SOVIET INFLUENCE IS IN JEOPARDY. WE BELIEVE MOREOVER THAT SOVIET INFLUENCE AT PRESENT IS POSITIVE INsofar AS ETHIOPIA AND US ARE CONCERNED. GIVEN SOVIET STAKE IN SOMALIA, WHICH REFLECTS LARGER AMBITIONS IN RED SEA BASIN, INDIAN OCEAN, AFRICA, ETC., WE DON'T BELIEVE SOVIETS WOULD RISK JEOPARDIZING THOSE LONGER TERM AMBITIONS FOR LIMITED OR UNCERTAIN END IN OGADEN, PARTICULARLY SO LONG AS US MAINTAINS EVEN MINIMAL MILITARY SUPPORT FOR ADDIS. WHILE SOVIETS SEEK ULTIMATE EXPULSION OF US INFLUENCE IN HORN AND AREA, OVER SHORT TERM WE SUSPECT THEY CAN USE US ROLE IN ETHIOPIA AS SUREST MEANS OF MAINTAINING AND IMPROVING THEIR CURRENT ADVANTAGES IN SOMALIA. WE WOULD SPECULATE -- AND SPECULATE ONLY -- THAT US PULLOUT IN ADDIS WOULD PROBABLY CONFRONT THEM WITH CONFLICTING POLICY CHOICES IN HORN WHICH THEY PERHAPS NOT YET PREPARED TO MAKE.

11. WE NOTE FINAALLY  
THAT SOVIETS -- IN WASHINGTON AND ADDIS --  
HAVE TOLD US SIAD WON'T STIR UP PROBLEMS IN OGADEN. WE BELIEVE  
THEY HAVE ASSUMED ON OUR PART A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THEIR  
ROLE IN SOMALIA THAN WE'VE BEEN WILLING TO DISCOVER FOR OURSELVES.  
WE THINK TIME HAS PROBABLY COME FOR US TO UNEQUIVOCALLY ACKNOWLEDGE  
THAT ROLE.  
HAMRICK UNQUOTE KISSINGER

SECRET

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